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ABSTRACT
Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMIs) enable advanced bidirectional communication
between utilities and smart meters deployed in the field, allowing consumption, outage, and
price information to be shared efficiently and reliably. The addition of this new infrastruc-
ture, connected through mesh networks, has given rise to new opportunities for adversaries to
interfere with communications and possibly compromise utilities’ assets or steal customers’
private information.
The goal of this thesis is to survey the various threats facing AMIs in order to identify and
understand the requirements for a comprehensive intrusion detection solution. The threat
analysis leads to an extensive set of failure scenarios that captures the attackers’ key ob-
jectives and is used to extract the information required to effectively detect attacks. Using
the information taken from the failure scenarios and knowledge of how encrypted communi-
cations can affect detection reliability, we explore possible intrusion detection system (IDS)
infrastructures and discuss deployment considerations for each of them, paying particular
attention to how well they can detect attacks. We also suggest that the widest coverage of
monitoring for attacks can be provided by a hybrid sensing infrastructure that uses both
a centralized intrusion detection system and embedded meter or dedicated standalone sen-
sors.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The size and scope of the electrical grid in the United States are almost unfathomable.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that more than 3,200 public utili-
ties control the over 10,000 power-generating units that deliver electricity through tens of
thousands of miles of transmission and distribution lines to millions of customers across the
country [1]. The introduction of a new metering infrastructure to energy delivery systems
is a significant change that requires a tremendous amount of planning. Laying the proper
security foundation is important in this planning to ensure that the infrastructure will be
resilient against the threat landscape targeting advanced metering infrastructure (AMI).
1.1 Motivation
Protecting power grid assets from computer attacks is a matter of national security and
public safety. However, in some countries, including the United States, many portions of the
power grid infrastructure are managed by private enterprises, which often operate under tight
security budgets. It is essential to identify the requirements for a comprehensive monitoring
solution that would enable utilities to gain situational awareness over the security state of
their infrastructure. Utilities need to understand the risks of AMI deployments and the
requirements for intrusion detection before they choose the monitoring architecture in which
to invest.
According to a publicly-available FBI intelligence bulletin, there is evidence that some AMI
deployments have already been hacked [2]. Smart meters are low-cost commodity devices
that operate in locations lacking the physical security necessary to prevent tampering. While
basic protective measures have been developed (e.g., tamper-evident seals), they may not
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provide sufficient protection from attacks over the lifespan of the meters, which has been
estimated to span several decades [3]. As the rate of AMI deployments increases, the number
of possible security threats continues to grow, raising concerns from governments and privacy
groups alike in regards to consumer privacy, grid reliability, and national security.
AMIs need an efficient and effective means of monitoring traffic in order to detect and
respond to malicious activity on the network. Distributed intrusion detection systems (DID-
Ses) show promise, though most research on them focuses on optimizing the arrangement
of nodes and communication among them. Few studies examine DIDSes in the context of
smart grid technology, and fewer still try to identify the best method for distributing nodes
and the challenge of monitoring encrypted traffic in the field, or so-called neighborhood-area
networks (NANs), in which smart meters are deployed.
1.2 Contribution
In this thesis, we present a collection of failure scenarios resulting from an extensive sur-
vey of the AMI threat landscape. We explore high-level attacker motivations as well as
individual attack techniques to elicit specific information required for detection. A second
contribution is an analysis of possible intrusion detection system (IDS) deployment options
in AMIs, weighing factors such as coverage and detection reliability. Combined with the
failure scenarios and required detection information, that analysis provides researchers and
utilities with the knowledge they need to make informed decisions regarding the state of
security in their AMI deployments. Another contribution is an analysis and discussion of
key management considerations in AMIs. Many smart meters have the option of enabling
encrypted communications, which presents a new set of problems in monitoring the network
for attacks. We examine existing work and propose possible solutions with respect to the
various deployment architectures.
This thesis is organized as follows. The remainder of Chapter 1 provides relevant back-
ground information on AMIs and explores related work. In Chapter 2, we present a collection
of failure scenarios resulting from an extensive survey of AMI-specific threats and a detailed
mapping to the information required for accurate attack detection. We describe four pos-
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sible deployment schemes for IDSes in AMIs in Chapter 3 and discuss various deployment
considerations for each of them. Chapter 4 presents key management considerations for
encrypted AMI communications for each of the architectures described in Chapter 3. We
conclude with Chapter 5.
1.3 AMI Overview
The role of AMI is to facilitate two-way communication between utility companies and
metering devices in smart grid initiatives around the world. AMI networks are being seen
more and more as a general-purpose communication infrastructure that can be used for a
wide range of smart grid needs, including not only billing, but demand response programs and
distribution automation applications. They benefit utilities and consumers alike by providing
remote electricity usage readings (on-demand and periodic), electricity price information
communication, alerts about outages and blackouts, the ability to remotely update meter
firmware, and more. Some AMI systems even allow operators to remotely connect and
disconnect customers from the electric grid. Some of these communications require reliable
real-time delivery, while others have the option of being buffered and delayed without any
negative consequences to the system. Since sensitive customer information is frequently sent
over the grid, additional security and privacy requirements have emerged.
In order to support those requirements as well as a wide range of meter deployment topolo-
gies (e.g., from dense urban settings to sparse rural environments), meter manufacturers have
developed highly flexible network architectures that can incorporate many different commu-
nication media. Typically, an AMI network consists of a multi-hop mesh network composed
of several thousand smart meters, a smaller number of gateway devices, and other network
devices that are connected to each other via wireless or power line communication (PLC)
technologies. AMI networks enable communication among smart meters and devices at-
tached to them as well as with servers in the utility company’s network. The networks
commonly adhere to the same network hierarchy (see Figure 1.1), with a wide-area network
(WAN) connecting the utilities to a set of gateways in the field, and then NANs, also called
field-area networks (FANs), connecting gateways to meters. Meters themselves can be used
3
Figure 1.1: Typical AMI Architecture
as gateways to access the home-area network (HAN) deployed within customer premises to
connect to thermostats and smart appliances.
A WAN uses long-range and high-bandwidth communication technologies, such as long-
range wireless (e.g., WiMAX), cellular (e.g., 3G, EVDO, EDGE, GPRS, or CDMA), satellite,
or PLC. NANs typically have shorter range requirements and can be deployed using wire-
less (e.g., IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15, or proprietary communication stacks) or PLC-based
technologies. In some cases, meters can directly include cellular capabilities or even use the
customer’s home Internet connection to bypass the need for separate WANs and local-area
networks (LANs). In this thesis, we focus on NANs that use a wireless mesh network. The
mesh topology brings robustness to the network, since communication routes can automati-
cally adapt when failures occur. However, they also represent a challenge for the deployment
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of an efficient security monitoring solution, because of their distributed nature and their use
of wireless communication technologies.
1.4 Related Work
The continuously growing threat landscape for AMIs has grabbed the attention of many
security researchers, and some of their recent work is closely related to ours. We conducted
a thorough survey of previous literature to identify fundamental attack steps within AMIs
and HANs.
1.4.1 Threat Analysis in AMI
A first category of research we studied did not specifically cover AMIs, but was useful in
clarifying the threats common to wireless networks. For instance, [4] examines attacks on
wireless networks to motivate solutions to address the privacy issue; [5] develops a threat
model to guide the design of a secure wireless local-area network (WLAN) architecture; [6]
and [7] study threats on mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs); [8] focuses on sensor networks;
and [9] and [10] investigate threats specific to mesh networks.
In the category of publications focusing on the smart grid, [11] presents the design of a
firewall to secure wireless communication in energy delivery systems. [12] examines attacks
targeting energy theft in AMIs; the authors later used that analysis to motivate a new
methodology for penetration testing in AMIs [13]. [14] offers a more comprehensive survey
of the threat landscape for AMIs. Some research efforts have addressed the security of
the wireless protocols popular in HAN communication. For instance, [15] surveys popular
security protocols used in wireless sensor networks for authentication, including ZigBee,
SPINS [16], and LEAP [17]. In-depth security analyses for these protocols, like ZigBee in
[18] and [19] and LEAP+ in [20], have been performed as well.
Home automation is an interesting area of research that utilizes many of the previously
mentioned wireless protocols. [21] explores wireless home automation, while discussing in-
teroperability between local home automation and the Internet. The use of a multi-port
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power electronic interface (MPEI) for smart home automation is discussed in [22], which
examines the systems’ ability to interact with the home (e.g., monitoring and controlling
home sensors or controlling appliances) through the use of an ethernet-connected interface
(such as a smartphone or laptop). [23] explores the EPIC open source home automation
framework with regard to interoperability, reliability, and support for multiple protocols, in-
cluding ZigBee. However, while those publications address usage and functionality of home
automation systems, they largely ignore the security aspects, even though they address the
benefits of such systems being connected to the Internet.
Still, there are some researchers addressing the security concerns of HANs. Customer
privacy issues, including the collection of energy consumption data to construct user behavior
patterns, are discussed in [24], [25], [26], and [27]. Enhancing security in HANs has been
explored in [28], which proposes a new authentication mechanism for smart devices. [29]
identifies a set of IDS requirements for AMIs and briefly mentions different sensor deployment
locations, including dedicated and meter-level sensors. [30] expands on that work to develop
a specification-based IDS specifically targeting attacks in HANs. Other closely related work
is described in [14], which covers threats prevalent in the AMI mesh network, along with
several sensor deployment ideas, suggesting that a hybrid approach (such as we describe in
Section 3.5) would provide the widest monitoring coverage.
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CHAPTER 2
FAILURE SCENARIOS
As the new communication and computational capabilities of smart grid devices are being
added to traditional energy delivery systems, the attack surface is increasing significantly.
Attacks on utilities that would normally require physical access to the utility network from
a more centralized location may now be possible through a remote exploit executed over
the Internet via access to one of the new devices. Smart meters are not just connected to
utility networks, but also directly connected to the devices and networks in customers’ homes,
which, in turn, are connected to the Internet and cellular networks. As those networks, which
were once isolated from each other, are coming together, new attack possibilities may appear.
In the context of AMIs and HANs, meters appear to be an attractive target for adversaries,
because not only are they deployed in large numbers and lacking the necessary physical
protection, but also they typically have limited or no security monitoring capabilities.
The goals of this chapter are to review the possible attack motivations and failure scenarios
that are specific to AMI networks and to tie them to individual attack techniques. A number
of representative case studies are explored to connect the attackers’ motivations with more
fine-grained, individual attack techniques. The results lead to an extensive collection of
failure scenarios and to the identification of the information required for detecting such
scenarios. Note that our analysis focused on AMI networks. While we include HAN access
as a possible entry vector, we do not explore HAN vulnerabilities in depth, and there may be
additional attacker motivations that involve additional attack techniques related to HANs;
however, these topics are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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2.1 Threat Survey
The key characteristics of an AMI that could attract malicious activity are (1) access
to a communication infrastructure other than the Internet, (2) access to millions of low-
computation devices, (3) access to sensitive customer information, (4) high visibility and
high impact in the case of disruption (e.g., a power outage), and (5) the financial value of
energy consumption data. Consequently, attackers could be motivated to abuse the commu-
nication infrastructure, reduce their energy bills, steal information from targeted customers,
remotely disconnect targeted customers or large regions, or create denial-of-critical-services.
A large set of attack techniques can be combined to reach those objectives. We conducted
a thorough survey of previous literature from 11 different universities and corporations to
identify fundamental attack techniques within AMI networks.
Our next step was to combine the attacks discussed in the literature in order to build a
holistic view of the AMI failure possibilities. From an initial list of 5 attack motivations
and more than 30 unique attack techniques, we first filtered out those irrelevant to the AMI
environment, and then worked on decomposing the remaining ones into individual attack
components. The motivation for the decomposition was to understand the fundamental
pieces of information required by a monitoring solution to detect any combination of those
attack techniques, including combinations that we did not cover in our threat model. We
accomplished this in [14] for failure scenarios in AMI networks; however, HANs were outside
the scope of our initial analysis.
We expand on that previous survey here to include scenarios and motivations affecting not
only AMI networks but also HANs. Our list of attack techniques grew, and we illustrate the
decomposition through a series of case studies. Finally, we present an updated set of failure
scenarios by combining the original set of scenarios presented in [14] with the additional
techniques we learned from our analysis of HANs.
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2.2 Attacker Motivation
We will now explore each of the high-level motivations of the adversaries in the failure
scenarios to follow:
Destroy Equipment
Destroying a utility’s power generation, transmission, or distribution equipment has
high public visibility and can be both costly to utility companies and inconvenient to
consumers. Whether the damage is to large transformers, neighborhood substations, or
individual smart meters or appliances, the end result can be long repair or replacement
times and loss of public confidence in the smart grid, in addition to financial strain on
the companies managing the grid.
Interrupt Service
While interrupting service can be achieved by destroying key equipment, there are
alternative methods of causing blackouts and other power interruptions that do not
involve physical destruction of electrical equipment. Service interruptions can affect
not just power, but also the financial and billing systems of the utility, and can cause
load-balancing problems in the management of electrical power demands.
Information Gathering
As advanced communication abilities are being added to electrical distribution in smart
grid deployments, much more information is being sent between customers and util-
ities. Customer information being transmitted back to the utility poses a privacy
concern and can be used maliciously by someone eavesdropping on the network. Ad-
ditionally, as billing and usage information are communicated over the same network,
it may be possible for an attacker to access the utility’s network from any point in the
AMI network. Finally, if any key distribution system is in place, monitoring of traffic
may provide adversaries with encryption keys, if proper security mechanisms are not
in place.
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Figure 2.1: Distributed DDoS Attack on a DCU [14]
Communication Medium
Whether it is used to coordinate additional attacks or to serve as a covert communi-
cation channel, the infrastructure of the AMI network may be useful to adversaries.
Energy Theft
Energy theft is a big concern for utility companies. It may consist of a small-scale
operation to lower a home electric bill or a larger effort to financially damage the
utility more severely. Now that everything in the smart grid is digital, there are new
opportunities for adversaries to control the system.
2.3 Case Studies
To elicit information that is needed to detect individual attacks, we explored a comprehensive
set of case studies that are representative of the attackers’ key objectives. Rather than
include every case study, we present a representative subset of them in this section and
include the results of each of them in the failure scenarios that follow. In the remainder of
this section, we look at five example case studies to demonstrate how they were used to tie
the attackers’ key objectives to the attack techniques.
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Figure 2.2: Sending of Remote Disconnect Commands through the DCU [14]
DDoS Attack Against the Data Collection Unit (DCU)
The attacker’s motivation in performing a distributed denial of service (DDoS) at-
tack [31] is to compromise the DCU and prevent relays deployed between the WAN
and NANs from communicating or functioning (see Figure 2.1). Assuming that the
entry point of the attack is in the smart meters, the following are typical individual
attack techniques that would be involved: (1) installation of malware on the meters
through physical tampering or exploitation of a network vulnerability; (2) coordination
of a DDoS campaign among the compromised meters; and (3) crafting and sending of
a large number of malicious network packets to the DCU.
Stealing Customer Information
The motivation of the second attack is to collect customer information and learn about
customer behavior by eavesdropping on the incoming and outgoing network traffic of
the meters. Considering that the AMI traffic may be encrypted, this attack may
involve the following individual steps: (1) theft of the decryption keys (or the master
seed number that is used to generate the keys), accomplished by physically accessing
the meters or performing brute-force attacks on the crypto system; (2) eavesdropping
on the AMI traffic to intercept the messages; and (3) decryption of the messages and
collection of the message contents.
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Sending Remote Disconnect Commands Through the DCU
Here, the attacker wishes to disconnect a large number of customers by exploiting the
“remote disconnect” functionality on the meters (see Figure 2.2). The DCU is very
likely to be the point for launches of these attacks, as it is one of the more suitable de-
vices for triggering the remote disconnect command for many customers without being
detected by the utility. The attack techniques involved are (1) installation of malware
on the DCU through physical tampering, exploitation of a network vulnerability, or
abuse of insider privileges; (2) identification of the meters and collection of information
about them (e.g., IP addresses); and (3) sending of remote disconnect commands to
the targeted meters.
Remote Access to Smart Devices
The motivation for this attack is to gain remote access to smart devices (e.g., home
appliances, electric vehicles, energy dashboards), perhaps to disable appliances (e.g.,
turn off refrigeration units in a warehouse, resulting in the loss of products). Assuming
that the entry point of the attack is a compromised smart meter (see Figure 2.3),
the following are typical individual attack techniques that would be involved: (1)
installation of malware on the smart device through the exploitation of a network
vulnerability; and (2) sending of a power-off or shut-down command to the smart
device.
Attacking a NAN from a HAN
In this attack, the motivation for compromising the NAN from the HAN is to yield
additional attack vectors, if compromising a smart meter directly is not an available
option (see Figure 2.4). Assuming that the entry point of the attack is through the
Internet, the following are typical individual attack techniques that would be involved:
(1) installation of malware on a smart device through the exploitation of a network
vulnerability; (2) installation of malware on a meter through the exploitation of a
network vulnerability; and (3) communication through the smart device to carry out
attacks from the smart meter.
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Figure 2.3: Attacking a HAN from a NAN
Figure 2.4: Attacking a NAN from a HAN
2.4 Failure Scenarios
Based on the results collected from the previously discussed threat survey and case studies,
we created a collection of failure scenarios that encompass the threat landscape of AMIs.
Next, we describe those scenarios, organized according to the attacker motivations detailed
in Section 2.2. We begin by detailing intermediate goals that adversaries would need to
attain before continuing to the main objectives.
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2.4.1 Failure Scenario Template
The graphical notation used is illustrated in Figure 2.5 and shows the various representations
that are used throughout the set of failure scenarios. Green nodes are the entry points to
the scenario. Green rectangles represent various ways an adversary may gain access to the
network (e.g., physical access to a meter through the optical port), while green ovals signify a
common intermediate goal that can be achieved through some other set of attack techniques
(e.g., access to a single compromised meter via a remotely executed network exploit).
Every failure scenario is terminated by an orange oval, which represents the attacker’s
motivation or main objective, or a green oval, which represents an intermediate goal whose
achievement enables additional actions. Intermediate goals can reappear in other scenarios.
The blue parallelograms represent individual attack techniques. Connection by a dotted line
indicates an “OR” relationship; that is, the child step can happen if any of the parent steps
occur. Solid lines indicate an “AND” relationship, which indicates that the child step can
follow only if all of the parent steps occur.
Figure 2.5: Failure Scenario: Template
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Figure 2.6: Failure Scenario: Gaining Access to a HAN
2.4.2 Building Blocks
Here, we present a set of failure scenarios that do not result in achievement of any of
the possible attacker goals discussed previously, but rather show some of the important
intermediate goals utilized in the remainder of the scenarios. Figure 2.6 shows the possible
set of entry points and attack techniques that can be used to gain the intermediate goal
of accessing a HAN, while Figure 2.7 does the same for achieving the intermediate goal
of compromising one or more meters, and Figure 2.8 for eavesdropping. To understand
how one may go about constructing an attack utilizing these scenarios, take, for example,
the intermediate goal of “Multiple Compromised Meters” in Figure 2.7. It is possible to
construct one possible attack by first gaining physical access to a meter and then using
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Figure 2.7: Failure Scenario: Compromising One or More Meters
a buffer overflow attack (exploit) to gain root access, thus compromising a single node.
Once a single meter has been compromised, a network exploit could be used to compromise
multiple meters, thus achieving the desired intermediate goal. However, one could have used
a different entry point and set of attack techniques to accomplish the same goal.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 also utilize all of the unique entry points (represented by green rect-
angles) used throughout the failure scenarios:
Physical Access to Meter
Smart meters operate in locations lacking the physical security necessary to prevent
tampering. While basic protective measures have been developed (e.g., tamper-evident
seals), they may not provide sufficient protection from adversaries looking to gain entry
to the network, whether by circumventing any tamper-resistant protections, interfac-
ing with the optical port on the meter, or communicating wirelessly with the device;
physical access to a meter may be the most accessible point of entry for any adversary.
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Figure 2.8: Failure Scenario: Eavesdropping
Physical Access to Device
Smart devices with network access, like thermostats, refrigerators, and smart cars, are
becoming increasingly popular in homes across the country. As these devices begin to
communicate with smart meters, they open up new access points to the network from
within the home. While these devices can be protected better than smart meters by
being placed indoors, they still serve as potential points of entry into the AMI network.
Internet Access
Internet access is easy to attain and can provide some degree of anonymity. Unlike
direct access to a smart meter or smart device, however, Internet access requires that
the adversary have additional knowledge in order to breach the boundary of the AMI
network. Unless the AMI utilizes the Internet in WAN communications, the Internet
might be a useful entry point in targeting AMI through the HAN.
Mesh Network Access
Accessing the mesh network that makes up the AMI communication is more difficult
than simply connecting to the Internet. The attacker may require specialized commu-
nication equipment and wireless radios in order to communicate with devices in the
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AMI. That could be costly, and it would require in-depth knowledge of the wireless
technologies and protocols used in communication over the network.
External Node or Device
Control of a custom meter or network node might be difficult to achieve, but may
prove to be a useful asset in gaining access to the AMI network. Other devices, like
wireless signal jammers, might be useful in achieving objectives as well.
2.4.3 Destroy Equipment
Figure 2.9 shows the entry points and attack techniques that can be used by an attacker
with the Destroy Equipment motivation. Damage to equipment can include destruction of
transformers, overloading of power substations, bricking of individual smart meters, and
communication failures, among other things. In turn, they can lead to high time and mon-
etary costs to the utility and can be highly visible to the public, resulting in long-term lack
of confidence in the smart grid and loss of reputation to the utility. This failure scenario
also introduces the Alter Network Stream intermediate goal, which involves techniques that
change the information that is being communicated over the AMI network. It is important
to note that there may be additional kinetic methods of achieving the same goal, but those
methods are outside the scope of this thesis.
Entry Points
• Single compromised meter (more than one meter may be involved, but a minimum
of one is required)
• Mesh network access
Impact
• Repair or replacement cost to utility
• Financial damage due to inability to bill customers
• Potential for brownouts or blackouts
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Figure 2.9: Failure Scenario: Destroy Equipment
• Potential cascading failures resulting in larger crisis
• Possible loss of life
• Public relations problems due to damaged reputation
• Loss of public confidence in utility and smart grid
2.4.4 Interrupt Service
Figure 2.10 shows the entry points and attack techniques that can be used by an attacker
with the Interrupt Service motivation. Adversaries may find ways to interrupt service beyond
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causing power outages, including damaging a utility’s ability to respond to cyber events.
Bringing down communication infrastructure has impacts on billing and power generation
and distribution systems. Interruption of service has an impact similar to that of destroying
equipment, but can be accomplished more covertly, if so desired.
Entry Points
• Single compromised meter
• Multiple compromised meters
• Physical access to meter
• External node or device
Impact
• Repair or replacement cost to utility
• Financial damage due to inability to bill customers
• Loss of ability to quickly respond to threats
• Loss of ability to measure and respond to changes in demand
• Potential for brownouts or blackouts
• Potential cascading failures resulting in larger crisis
• Public relations issues due to damaged reputation
• Loss of public confidence in utility and smart grid
2.4.5 Information Gathering
Figure 2.11 shows the entry points and attack techniques that can be used by an attacker
with the Information Gathering motivation. Information gathering can be used to gain
access to encryption keys, private utility information, or personal customer information,
among other things. Covert compromise of the key distribution system of a utility can open
up a large array of other attack vectors and lead to other potential problems. Data breaches
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Figure 2.10: Failure Scenario: Interrupt Service
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Figure 2.11: Failure Scenario: Information Gathering
can result in high costs to the utility if customer privacy is compromised and can lead to
lack of public confidence in the smart grid and damage to the reputation of the utility.
Entry Points
• Single compromised meter (more than one meter may be involved, but a minimum
of one is required)
• Mesh network access
• External node or device
• Eavesdropping
Impact
• Key compromise may require costly rekeying effort
• Financial damage due to privacy breach
22
• Financial damage due to lawsuits and fines
• Customers may experience privacy violations
• Public relations issues due to damaged reputation
• Loss of public confidence in utility and smart grid
2.4.6 Communication Medium
Figure 2.12 shows the entry points and attack techniques that can be used by attackers
with the Communication Medium motivation. While using the AMI network strictly as a
covert communication medium may not directly harm the utility, it may degrade the utility’s
situational awareness of the network by causing delays in regular communications. It can
also be used to coordinate additional attacks that may cause more direct harm to the utility
financially or to the quality of service delivered to customers.
Entry Points
• Multiple compromised meters
Impact
• Loss of ability to quickly respond to threats
• Loss of ability to measure and respond to changes in demand
2.4.7 Energy Theft
Figure 2.13 shows the entry points and attack techniques that can be used by an attacker
with the Energy Theft motivation. Energy theft can result in large financial losses to the
utility due to lack of revenue. It can be accomplished on a small scale that slowly affects the
financial health of the utility or on a larger scale with high visibility, which may result in loss
of public confidence in the smart grid. Alternatively, adversaries may reverse the outcome
by providing the utility company with higher revenues. That could result in financial loss to
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Figure 2.12: Failure Scenario: Communication Medium
the utility in terms of lawsuits and fines, and could be even more damaging to the utility’s
reputation.
Entry Points
• External node or device
• Eavesdropping
• Alter network stream
Impact
• Financial damage due to loss of revenue
• Financial damage due to lawsuits and fines if the utility is found to be overcharging
• Potential for brownouts or blackouts
• Customer inconvenience
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• Customer service issues due to actions required to resolve billing disputes
• Public relations issues due to damaged reputation
• Loss of public confidence in utility and smart grid
Figure 2.13: Failure Scenario: Energy Theft
2.5 Information Required for Detection
From the failure scenarios presented in Section 2.4, we were able to extract individual at-
tack techniques. The set of information required to detect different steps in those attack
techniques is presented in Table 2.1.
Each row of the table is an individual low-level attack technique that can be used alone
or in combination with other techniques to build complex failure scenarios. As explained in
the previous section, our goals are to identify fundamental attack techniques and to identify
the core information required for their detection. With that information, we will be able to
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Table 2.1: List of individual attack techniques and information required to detect them
(adapted from [14])
Category Attack technique Target Information required
DoS Collision in Packet
Transmission
NAN Link Layer NAN collision rate, node response time
DoS Packet Flood Node in NAN (Me-
ter/DCU)
CPU and memory usage of target in-
coming network traffic, authorized net-
work protocols, network health infor-
mation, packet-per-second rate, node
response time
DoS Jamming NAN Physical Layer NAN signal level, node response time
DoS Alter Routing Table Routing Protocol Routing table health, node response
time
DoS Drop Packets NAN Traffic Packet loss among nodes in mesh net-
work
DoS Destroy Node Node in NAN (Me-
ter/DCU)
Node availability / response time
DoS Time-
Desynchronization
Node in NAN (DCU) Time-synchronization traffic among
nodes or time configured on nodes
DoS Resource Exhaustion
(Battery, Band-
width, or CPU)
Node in NAN (Me-
ter/DCU)
Traffic among meters, valid traffic pro-
file or node health (CPU, battery con-
sumption), network health (bandwith
usage)
Spoofing Impersonate Regular
Node
Node in NAN (Meter) Associations between physical ad-
dresses and node identity
Spoofing Impersonate Master
Node
Node in NAN (DCU) Associations between physical ad-
dresses and node identity, associations
between regular and master node reg-
istrations
Spoofing Man-in-the-Middle NAN Traffic Associations between physical ad-
dresses and node identity
Spoofing Wormhole NAN Traffic Associations between physical ad-
dresses and node identity, routing table
integrity/update
Spoofing Slander Distributed Detection
System
Integrity of trust and reputation sys-
tem
Eavesdropping Passively Listen to
Traffic
NAN Traffic N/A (undetectable)
Eavesdropping Active Cryptoanaly-
sis
NAN Traffic Traffic among meters
Physical Compromise Meter Node in NAN (Meter) Integrity of meter firmware, memory
contents of meter, meter firmware up-
grade policy, meter status, information
about bandwidth and wireless signal
Communication Attack Coordination Traffic in NAN Network protocols that are authorized
for use, network traffic among the me-
ters, network characteristics of legiti-
mate traffic
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ensure that any combination of those steps can be detected when the appropriate detection
technology is used.
The information required for detection can be organized into three categories:
System Information
Health reports from meter and gateways (CPU, battery consumption), firmware and
software integrity of AMI devices, clock synchronization
Network Information
NAN collision rate, packet loss, node response time, traffic rate, health and integrity
of routing table, associations between physical addresses and node identity
Policy Information
Authorized AMI protocols, authorized AMI devices, authorized traffic patterns, au-
thorized route updates, authorized firmware updates
It is crucial to extract knowledge from the mapping between attacks and information re-
quired for detection in order to design a comprehensive and cost-efficient monitoring solution.
Certainly, the categorizations presented in the table reveal that data must be collected from
multiple points in the infrastructure. For example, the need for information on the health
and integrity of routing tables requires routers (or, in the context of AMIs, meters) to be
instrumented so that they can send periodic health reports or at least be remotely queried
for health and integrity checks. However, instrumentation of all routers in the network may
be too expensive, and a more cost-effective solution could be to rely on attack manifestations
at other locations in the system instead of routers for detection.
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CHAPTER 3
IDS ARCHITECTURES
Having identified the information required to detect common attacks in the previous chapter,
we are now in a position to sketch possible IDS deployment schemes. This chapter explores
four different approaches and discusses how effective each would be in detecting attacks, as
well as deployment considerations for each of them.
3.1 Architecture Overview
The four architectures discussed in this chapter all have benefits and drawbacks that must be
weighed before the most appropriate security monitoring solution is selected. We present an
overview of each of the architectures before discussing deployment considerations for each.
Centralized Infrastructure
This option is both cost-effective and well-tested, as it is similar to many enterprise
network security monitoring solutions. It provides many benefits in terms of cost and
visibility, especially for encrypted traffic, but fails to provide full situational awareness
over the entire AMI network.
Embedded Infrastructure
An embedded infrastructure provides the most comprehensive coverage of meter-to-
meter communication and monitoring of smart meter devices. However, key manage-
ment concerns and computational limitations are drawbacks of this type of deployment.
Dedicated Infrastructure
This solution provides wide coverage over most of the AMI network and is better able
to handle key management concerns. Despite those benefits, this type of infrastructure
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has added complexities due to placement of the sensor units, and it is not ideal for
detecting attacks that aim to compromise any single device.
Hybrid Infrastructure
By combining the centralized and embedded or dedicated infrastructures, we are able
to reap the benefits from multiple solutions. However, this approach increases the
overall cost of the IDS deployment, and it does not remove all of the limitations of the
various architectures.
3.2 Centralized Infrastructure
A centralized monitoring architecture is the most cost-effective solution and would consist of
a single IDS sensor deployed at the head-end located in the utility data center, as shown in
Figure 3.1. That is where smart meter data is processed and stored, and the sensor would be
able to monitor all traffic that flows in and out of the AMI through the data center. In such
a deployment, this type of infrastructure would only be able to access and analyze network
traffic to and from the AMI network, maintenance and upgrade policies, and system logs
from AMI appliances; peer-to-peer traffic between nodes in the AMI network would not be
visible. Therefore, this type of sensor would be able to detect systemic attacks that target
the utility network and insider attacks that leave traces in access logs. It would also be able
to analyze anti-tampering alerts sent to the utility by smart meters.
The centralized infrastructure approach is similar to many enterprise solutions employed
today on corporate networks, where data is transmitted between two different networks (e.g.,
Intranet-Intranet or Intranet-Internet). In such setups, data can be monitored at a central
location, since communication typically has to go through a small number of routers, or
endpoints, that serve as points of traffic aggregation in the network. One advantage of this
approach is that the utility would be able to perform analysis on fully decrypted packets,
as an IDS sensor located at the data center would have access to all the cryptographic keys
needed to decrypt encrypted traffic.
Even though a centralized IDS infrastructure would be able to capture most of the traffic
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in the network, its detection capabilities would be limited to detecting attacks that origi-
nate from the utility, targeting the AMI network, or vice versa. While our analysis of the
information required for detection (see previous chapter) shows that an IDS sensor at the
head-end is needed, it is not sufficient to provide an encompassing situational awareness of
the AMI network as a whole. Certainly, there could be a number of attacks within the AMI
that do not pass through the utility data center.
Attacks against the routing protocol of the mesh network, MAC or PHY layer attacks,
and end-to-end application layer attacks between peer-to-peer AMI nodes are examples of
items that a central sensor would miss. For instance, attack techniques such as “installing
malware on the meter” or “eavesdropping on NAN traffic” through an active cryptanalysis
(i.e., by injecting traffic to force nodes to generate encrypted packets) would be undetected
by the central sensor, because it would not have access to information such as the integrity
of the meter firmware, the memory contents of the meter, the NAN traffic among meters,
the network bandwidth usage, or the routing table integrity. Such gaps in attack coverage
associated with the centralized IDS warrant a closer look at a more distributed approach.
Figure 3.1: Centralized IDS Infrastructure
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3.3 Embedded Infrastructure
An embedded sensor infrastructure (like the one depicted in Figure 3.2) in which IDS sensors
are placed within the smart meters could be used to effectively monitor all of the traffic
passing between meters as well as gain access to meter-specific information. Sensors could
be placed in all meters, or alternatively, IDS sensors could be placed in a selected subset
of strategic meters (as discussed by Shin et al. [32]). The latter option would minimize the
number of sensors required while still providing many of the benefits of this architecture.
Since meters in the mesh network function not only as end points but also as relays, meters
instrumented with sensors would have complete visibility over meter-specific information
such as health reports, firmware and software integrity, and memory contents. Access to that
kind of information would make it easier to detect attacks that target individual meters. A
collection of meters with embedded sensors would have a holistic view of traffic flowing within
the AMI network. The large number of sensors would provide redundancy to the system
and increase the fault tolerance of the security monitoring system, greatly improving the
accuracy and increasing the trustworthiness of generated alerts. That level of accessibility
would also allow instrumented meters to be effective at analyzing the contents of messages
flowing within the AMI and at detecting malicious packets.
Furthermore, embedded sensors would be effective at detecting attacks that originate from
within the HAN (e.g., through a compromised smart device or appliance) or within other
attached networks and devices. Such attacks, in order to propagate to other parts of the
AMI, would first need to target the meter. The meter sensors would have the ability to
inspect incoming messages and detect any unusual or prohibited commands before they
can be executed or passed along. With such an embedded architecture, no specialized
equipment or training would be required, as the sensors would be components of the smart
meters. Likewise, permits would not be needed to install and run the infrastructure (beyond
whatever was needed to install the AMI network itself). Thus, there would be savings in
terms of both time and cost.
Attacks that are performed directly on the DCU or components besides the smart meters,
however, would be missed by the meter sensors. Detection of such attacks would require data
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that would be out of the embedded sensors’ reach. In contrast, the centralized IDS would
have access to DCU-specific data and be more effective in detecting such attacks. Also, since
some portions of the AMI traffic might be encrypted, the instrumented meters would need
to have access to all of the necessary decryption keys in order to properly inspect network
packets passing through from other meters. Sharing of keys would need to be done through
a secure communication channel and protected well at the meters, since storage of these
keys on the meters would increase the impact of a compromise of one of these units. On the
other hand, the centralized IDS, as noted previously, would have access to all encryption
keys, giving it easy access to encrypted traffic.
It is also worth noting that most smart meters have very limited processing power, stor-
age, and communication capabilities. Limited processing power would limit the amount of
analysis that could be done at each sensor, and it would be difficult to deploy a resource-
intensive sensor, as it might be a detriment to the meter’s daily operations. Installing a
proper sensor might require hardware upgrades that would increase the per-meter costs to
the utility. While meter vendors could sell more powerful meters that could handle such
intrusion detection functions, utilities might be unwilling to pay the additional price. Most
utilities need to purchase millions of smart meters, so a small increment in price for each
meter (e.g., a few dollars) could result in an additional investment of millions of dollars.
3.4 Dedicated Infrastructure
An alternative deployment scheme would be a dedicated sensing infrastructure, as shown in
Figure 3.3, in which a small number of dedicated sensors are deployed to monitor NANs. The
dedicated sensors could be used to monitor not only security events, but also the health of
the network (e.g., number and type of routing error messages or retransmissions of control
packets). The key advantage would be that dedicated sensors, unlike embedded sensors,
deliver high availability of processing power and storage, as the dedicated devices would be
more powerful than smart meters. In addition, the number of dedicated devices needed to
perform tasks would be smaller than the number of smart meters that would be needed to
perform the same tasks.
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Figure 3.2: Embedded IDS Infrastructure
Dedicated infrastructure allows for the performance of much more complex IDS functions
(e.g., full specification-based detection [29]) while having no impact on daily meter opera-
tions. This solution offers an interesting trade-off between network visibility and deployment
cost: the number of dedicated sensors needed to cover NANs would be far smaller than the
total number of meters, but the dedicated infrastructure would have smaller detection cov-
erage.
Like the sensors in the embedded sensing infrastructure, dedicated sensors would have
access to the AMI network data and be capable of monitoring all of the traffic flowing
within the AMI network. Decryption keys would still need to be distributed to the sensors,
but would be more manageable, since the number of dedicated sensors sharing keys would
be much smaller than the number of embedded sensors that would need to share keys. Thus,
the attack surface for key compromises would be greatly reduced.
However, dedicated sensors would not have access to meter-specific or DCU-specific data;
therefore, they would be unable to monitor for attacks performed directly on the meters or
the DCU units. Attacks originating within a HAN attempting to compromise a meter would
go unnoticed until the meter started to communicate with other units. Similarly, attacks
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from a smart meter targeting a device within a HAN would go undetected as well.
From a practical point of view, the cost and complexity of installation and maintenance
must also be considered when deploying this type of IDS infrastructure. While smart meters
have reserved sockets in which they are installed, dedicated sensors would have to be placed
elsewhere (e.g., on light poles or rooftops). Such an installation would usually require a
site survey, permits, renting of installation sites, and highly specialized personnel, especially
if the installations were in places that were difficult to reach. Similarly, maintenance of
the dedicated sensors would require that specialized personnel and equipment gain physical
access to the IDS sensors. In addition, in multi-channel networks, different sets of nodes
or even different pairs of nodes may communicate simultaneously on different channels, and
channel selection may change on a per-packet basis. That would require that the sensor be
able to decode traffic on multiple channels simultaneously. Off-the-shelf hardware with that
kind of functionality is not currently available for all PHY/MAC layers in use in smart grid
networks, increasing the cost of the IDS sensor.
Figure 3.3: Dedicated IDS Infrastructure
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3.5 Hybrid Infrastructure
A combination of the centralized sensor and embedded meter sensors might provide the
widest coverage in detecting attacks. Attacks that could not be covered by the centralized
IDS (e.g., attacks performed directly on the meters, or malicious packets that flow within the
AMI) would be covered by the meter sensors. The meter sensors would also cover attacks
that originate in the HAN. Nevertheless, it might be hard to convince meter vendors to
embed the sensor capabilities, as they could push costs up where margins are already small.
Alternatively, dedicated sensors could also be used together with the centralized sensor, as
shown in Figure 3.4, to monitor the traffic that flows within the AMI and manage complex
IDS operations. There could be more financial incentives for security companies to build
dedicated sensors and utilities to deploy them, as fewer sensors might be needed (relative to
the number of meters), especially in dense urban areas. Attacks that originate from the HAN
or attacks performed directly on the meters would be missed, thus reducing the monitoring
coverage.
Figure 3.4: Hybrid IDS Infrastructure
35
3.6 Geolocation Coverage Analysis
In deciding which IDS architecture to deploy, a utility must take many factors into con-
sideration, and there likely is not a one-size-fits-all solution. It has been suggested that a
hybrid approach to intrusion detection in AMI, consisting of a centralized detection unit at
the utility and distributed sensors in the field, may provide the widest detection coverage
[14]. In this section, we model such a hybrid architecture from the point of view of a utility
company looking to gain situational awareness over the security state of its infrastructure,
while taking into consideration the need to create a business case for investing in IDSes for
their AMI network. We do not perform the analysis for every possible architecture, as the
goals and requirements for each deployment are unique. Rather, we provide the model as a
demonstration of one process that utilities can use to select the best security monitoring so-
lution for their AMI deployments. Because of the large disparities among AMI deployments
and the complications in estimating risks, we first present our model at a high level, with
the goal of providing a framework for further study.
3.6.1 Model Description
To evaluate the optimal IDS sensor density for a given AMI deployment, we performed our
analysis using a stochastic model of a network of smart meters. In our model, we are able to
control characteristics of the AMI deployment (e.g., sensor coverage), in addition to other
aspects of the system, like IDS sensor properties (e.g., attack detection probabilities). We
then performed a series of case studies in which we assigned values to those parameters to
examine three realistic environments: urban, suburban, and rural AMI deployments.
The scope of our analysis is limited to modeling the reliability of a network of distributed
IDS sensors by first detecting an attack at the source (e.g., the meter being attacked).
The model does not model attack propagation throughout the AMI network, nor does it
differentiate between different types of attacks or take into account attacks that do not
target individual meters. The use of dedicated sensors offers an interesting trade-off between
network visibility and deployment cost, since the number of sensors needed to sufficiently
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cover AMI deployments would be far smaller than the total number of meters.
However, evaluating optimal IDS sensor density does raise questions regarding meter cov-
erage and detection reliability, which are examined in our model. Because of state-space
concerns, we assume single coverage for meters in the AMI network, though we are able to
change the percentage of meters that are covered by at least one sensor. For example, in
a sample deployment of 1000 meters in an urban environment, perhaps 90% of the meters
are covered by at least one of 25 dedicated IDS sensors. Given the same 25 dedicated IDS
sensors and a 1000-meter deployment in a rural area, perhaps only 35% of the meters are
covered by the IDS sensors. What is the reliability of the first system compared to the
second?
In order to model the detection reliability of a dedicated IDS sensor architecture, we first
developed a model representing an AMI deployment in which the IDS sensors would be
deployed. The entire model was developed in Mo¨bius [33], a software tool for modeling the
behavior of complex systems. In order to lay the groundwork for future study, our initial
model is composed of two meters, which represent two types of meters in an AMI deployment.
One meter lacks any coverage from an IDS sensor, while the other one is covered by at least
one IDS sensor. We use these two meters to represent a large sample of meters in an AMI
network.
If an attack occurs in the AMI network, we assume that all meters are equally likely to be
targeted. Our models of the two meters have three primary components: sensor coverage,
which describes the number of dedicated sensors covering the meter (which is 1, for the
purposes of this thesis); attack targeting, which determines whether the meter is the target
of an attack, given that an attack has occurred; and attack detection, which determines
whether an attack is detected, given that there is coverage by at least one sensor and an
attack is targeting the meter.
When an attack occurs, the attack-targeting component of the model selects one of the
two types of meters to direct the attack, based on the IDS coverage discussed in Section
3.6.2. We assume that all of the meter types have the same chance of being targeted. If the
attack targets a meter that lacks IDS coverage, the attack automatically goes undetected.
If the attack targets a meter that is covered by a dedicated sensor, the attack detection
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Figure 3.5: SAN Model of Basic AMI Deployment
component of the targeted meter takes over. As long as there is coverage (sensors fail with
rate fs, and are repaired with rate rs), the attack will be detected with some detection rate
rd.
Our model, in its entirety, is shown in Figure 3.5. Additional documentation on this model
can be found in Appendix A.
3.6.2 Coverage Percentage Analytical Study
We first explore IDS coverage for each of the three deployments (urban, suburban, and rural)
in an analytical study. Among the various inputs required by our model, the percentage of
meters that are covered by a set number of dedicated sensors pc requires additional study.
The number of meters nm is well-known by utilities, since it matches their customer base. We
can express the number of smart meters in terms of area through the use of several basic meter
densities derived from U.S. Census data on household densities [34], assuming one meter per
household. In particular, the densities for urban, suburban, and rural environments are
972.5, 128.7, and 7.5, respectively. Holding the total number of meters being monitored, nm,
constant at 5,000, we are looking at a coverage area of
Area = 5, 000/Household Density (3.1)
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Substituting in the proper household density, we achieve Au = 5.14, As = 38.85, and
Ar = 666.67 for urban, suburban, and rural environments, respectively. Those results are
reasonable, since the total area of an urban environment is smaller than the surrounding
suburban area, which, in turn, is smaller than the surrounding rural area.
Coverage of a wireless network by dedicated sensors requires that the sensors be deployed
such that they can overhear any packet sent by a smart meter within the AMI network area.
A typical density used as a guideline for the deployment of Wi-Fi access points is in the
range of 50-60 nodes per square mile, given a range of 300 feet per node [35]. We adopt that
guideline for our dedicated sensor evaluation. Utilizing the same household density figures,
we can express pc in terms of the area that needs to be covered and the number of dedicated
sensors ns, as follows:
puc = ((ns/60) ∗ 972.5)/nm = 0.003242 ∗ ns (3.2)
psc = ((ns/60) ∗ 128.7)/nm = 0.000429 ∗ ns (3.3)
Rural environments are a special case. Assuming that meters are perfectly dispersed over
a given area, we need only one sensor per meter to provide coverage. Any redundant sensors
per area would be a waste and could otherwise be used elsewhere. For the rural environment
case, we arrive at the following probability for rural environments:
prc = (ns/7.5)/nm = 0.000027 ∗ ns (3.4)
3.6.3 Experiment
In order to execute our model, we must select values for important parameters (i.e., fs, rs,
and rd). The rate of detection will vary widely among IDS implementations. For the purpose
of our study, we assumed rd = 0.95. Similarly, the failure rate of an IDS sensor will vary
among hardware implementations, and the repair rate of broken sensors will vary according
to utility response times. In our model, we assume that the IDS sensors have a 95% uptime,
resulting in fs = 0.05 and rs = 0.95.
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Table 3.1: Table of IDS coverages, associated mean detection percentages, and 95%
confidence intervals for urban, suburban, and rural environments
# Sensors puc µ
u
d p
s
c µ
s
d p
r
c µ
r
d
100 0.324 30.658 ± 21.259 0.043 4.057 ± 3.892 0.003 0.255 ± 0.255
200 0.648 61.315 ± 23.720 0.0868 8.114 ± 7.455 0.005 0.511 ± 0.508
300 0.973 91.972 ± 7.383 0.129 12.170 ± 10.689 0.008 0.766 ± 0.760
309 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.133 12.535 ± 10.964 0.008 0.789 ± 0.783
400 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.172 16.227 ± 13.594 0.011 1.021 ± 1.011
500 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.215 20.284 ± 16.170 0.014 1.277 ± 1.260
600 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.257 24.341 ± 18.416 0.016 1.532 ± 1.508
700 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.300 28.397 ± 20.333 0.019 1.787 ± 1.755
800 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.343 32.454 ± 21.921 0.022 2.043 ± 2.001
900 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.386 36.511 ± 23.180 0.024 2.298 ± 2.245
1000 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.429 40.568 ± 24.110 0.027 2.553 ± 2.488
1100 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.472 44.624 ± 24.711 0.030 2.809 ± 2.730
1200 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.515 48.681 ± 24.983 0.032 3.064 ± 2.970
1300 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.558 52.738 ± 24.925 0.035 3.319 ± 3.209
1400 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.601 56.795 ± 24.538 0.038 3.574 ± 3.447
1500 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.644 60.852 ± 23.822 0.041 3.830 ± 3.683
1600 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.686 64.908 ± 22.777 0.043 4.085 ± 3.918
1700 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.729 68.965 ± 21.403 0.046 4.340 ± 4.152
1800 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.772 73.022 ± 19.700 0.049 4.596 ± 4.385
1900 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.815 77.079 ± 17.667 0.051 4.851 ± 4.616
2000 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.858 81.135 ± 15.306 0.054 5.106 ± 4.846
2100 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.901 85.192 ± 12.615 0.057 5.362 ± 5.074
2200 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.944 89.160 ± 9.665 0.059 5.617 ± 5.302
2300 1 94.564 ± 5.141 0.987 93.306 ± 6.246 0.062 5.872 ± 5.528
2332 1 94.564 ± 5.141 1 94.563 ± 5.141 0.063 5.954 ± 5.600
2400 1 94.564 ± 5.141 1 94.563 ± 5.141 0.065 6.128 ± 5.752
Table 3.1 contains the results of execution of our model for a variable number of dedicated
sensors, utilizing the coverage equations discussed previously and the parameters specified
in the previous paragraph. We illustrate mean detection probabilities, µud , µ
s
d, and µ
r
d, for
the three different environments in Figure 3.6.
3.6.4 Discussion
Our results are consistent with intuition. Increasing the number of dedicated sensors in an
urban environment quickly increases the detection reliability of the distributed IDS system,
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Figure 3.6: Number of Dedicated Sensors vs. Detection Reliability for Urban, Suburban,
and Rural AMI Deployments
because of the high density of meters in such an environment. In a suburban deployment,
a larger number of sensors is required to achieve the same detection reliability. For rural
deployments, a significantly larger number of sensors is required to achieve the same detection
reliability. That suggests that for rural deployments, it may be infeasible for utilities to place
sensors that provide high coverage.
In fact, the business case for deploying IDSes in a rural environment maybe even worse
than what is suggested by our results. While we assume that there is one sensor per meter
in rural AMI deployments, there may in fact be many more. Some rural AMI networks
consist of a large chain of smart meters forming a line. Deployment of dedicated IDS devices
to monitor such a network would require at least one dedicated IDS sensor for every two
smart meters, if not one for every smart meter. In contrast, in urban deployments, we
have seen sensor nodes with several hundred (or even a thousand) smart meters within the
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Figure 3.7: SAN Model of an IDS Sensor System
same wireless communication range; therefore, a single dedicated IDS device can potentially
monitor hundreds of smart meters, making a dedicated infrastructure cost-effective in large,
high-density deployments. Our results seem to suggest similar cost-effectiveness for suburban
environments as well.
Additionally, the detection reliability does not surpass the sensor detection rate of 0.95
regardless of the AMI deployment environment. That shows empirically that the detection
rate of an IDS system, regardless of sensor reliability or the size of the deployment, is limited
to the quality of the IDS algorithm being utilized.
3.7 Detection Coverage Analysis
While our first model offered a high-level insight into how sensor coverage varies by deploy-
ment environment, it did not fully represent how sensors provide coverage to meters in a
dedicated IDS infrastructure. In a real-world deployment, per-meter coverage is not always
attained. While some meters may be monitored only by one sensor, depending on coverage,
there may be some meters that are covered by more than one sensor and others that lack
any coverage at all. For example, in a sample deployment of 1000 meters and 25 sensors,
90% of the meters may be covered by at least one sensor, 40% by at least 2 sensors, and
15% by more than 2 sensors. How would the addition of another optimally placed sensor
affect reliability of the system, and hence the probability of detecting or preventing a specific
failure scenario?
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Figure 3.8: SAN Model of an AMI Meter
3.7.1 Model Description
To evaluate the optimal IDS sensor density for an environment with varying degrees of
coverage, we again performed our analysis using stochastic models, but this time with a
more advanced model of a network of smart meters that can have varying coverage. We also
applied the model to three of the five case studies discussed in Section 2.3: DDoS, remote
disconnect, and stealing of customer information. We modeled the failure scenarios using
Adversary View Security Evaluation (ADVISE) models, in which we could control attributes
of the adversaries such as specific technical skill levels, the appeal of reaching specific goals,
and willingness to perform certain actions despite the associated detection probabilities. Our
improved model shares some of the limitations of the first. In particular, it is still limited to
modeling the reliability of a network of distributed sensors attempting to detect an attack
at the source (e.g., the meter being attacked).
In this model, we represented each sensor with a single token in a simple cycle rotating
between two states, working and broken, at certain exponential rates, repair rate rr and
failure rate rf (Figure 3.7). We represented each meter as a more complex model in which
a token representing an occurring attack would result in either the detected state or the
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undetected state (Figure 3.8). That final state would be determined by whether or not the
specific meter was covered by at least one operational sensor at the time of the attack and
the probability that the sensor could detect the given attack.
In order to model each smart meter system failure scenario, we next developed a model
with the ADVISE formalism for each given scenario. In the case of a DDoS attack, we
determined that meters must first be compromised before executing the attack (Figure 3.9).
In order to compromise a meter, the adversary first had to install malware on a meter by
taking advantage of physical access to the meter, insider privileges, or known network vul-
nerabilities. The detection probability and execution time of the malware installation were
dependent on the access to the meter, the adversary’s level of DDoS skill, and the number
of sensors covering the targeted meter. The success rate of the DDoS attack depended on
the number of compromised meters.
Second, to handle remote disconnects, we determined that in order to send a remote
disconnect command, the adversary had to have access to a compromised meter and had
to have specific information about the target (e.g., IP address) (Figure 3.10). In order to
acquire the specific information about the target, the adversary had to have access to a
compromised meter. The adversary could acquire that access by installing malware on a
given meter (just as in the DDoS scenario). The detection probability and execution time
of the malware installation would depend on the access to the meter and the number of
sensors covering the targeted meter. The detection probability, execution time, and success
probability of the specific meter information acquisition and remote disconnect command
transmission depend on the adversary’s skill level pertaining to the wireless meter protocol.
Third, in order to steal a customer’s information, the adversary had to know the appro-
priate decryption keys and have access to the encrypted messages sent from said customer
(Figure 3.11). Obtaining the decryption keys was possible through brute-forcing of the
cryptographic system of the AMI. The encrypted messages sent from the customer could be
obtained either by compromising a meter with malware or by using an RF sniffer on the
same frequencies of the AMI air traffic. The detection probability and execution time needed
to brute-force the crypto system depended on the access to the meter, the number of sensors
covering the targeted meter, and the adversary’s cryptography skills. The detection proba-
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Figure 3.9: ADVISE Model of DDoS Attack Scenario
Figure 3.10: ADVISE Model of Remote Disconnect Attack Scenario
bility and execution time of installing malware on a meter depend on the access medium to
the meter, the number of sensors covering the targeted meter, and the network-sniffing skills
of the adversary. The execution time needed to eavesdrop on the AMI traffic depended only
on the adversary’s network-sniffing skills.
Additional documentation on this model can be found in Appendix A.
3.7.2 Adversary Classification
Because of the complexity of the multitude of possible adversary backgrounds, we parame-
terized the adversaries as the most likely candidates for each given scenario in terms of skill
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Figure 3.11: ADVISE Model of Information Theft Attack Scenario
levels, initial accesses, initial knowledge, willingness to take risks, and motivation to reach
a final goal. For example, we classified the DDoS adversary as an activist group, or a group
that is willing to disrupt order. The group has low to medium technical skills, low access
levels and initial knowledge, high willingness to take risks, and medium to high motivation to
reach a final goal. Next, we classified the remote disconnect adversary as a corporation, an
adversary that is willing to maliciously disconnect another corporation from power in order
to ruin a product or just cause general disruption. That adversary has high skill levels, low
to medium initial access, medium to high initial knowledge, low willingness to take risks, and
medium motivation to reach the final goal. Finally, we classified the adversary most likely
to steal customer information as a lone burglar, an adversary who may use the information
to determine whether an occupant is away in order to plan a robbery. That adversary has
low skill levels, low initial access and knowledge, high willingness to take risks, and high
motivation to reach the final goal.
3.7.3 Experiment
To analyze the effectiveness of additional dedicated IDS sensors, we set up four model ar-
chitectures: one in which an attack always occurs and three in which the three previously
discussed attack scenarios occur. For each of the models, we used a fixed value of 20 meters
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Table 3.2: Table of IDS coverages, attacker willingnesses, and 95% confidence intervals for
general, denial of service, remote disconnect, and privacy attacks
Sensor Density pAttackd p
DOS
d WDOS p
Rem
d WSteal p
Steal
d WSteal
0.000 0 0.040 ± 0.039 1.000 0 1.000 0.020 ± 0.028 1.000
0.250 0.200 ± 0.079 0.280 ± 0.088 1.000 0.300 ± 0.090 1.000 0.320 ± 0.092 1.000
0.500 0.470 ± 0.098 0.480 ± 0.098 1.000 0.400 ± 0.097 1.000 0.470 ± 0.098 1.000
0.750 0.730 ± 0.087 0.800 ± 0.079 1.000 0 0.000 0.720 ± 0.088 1.000
1.000 0.900 ± 0.059 0.940 ± 0.064 1.000 0 0.000 0.940 ± 0.047 1.000
1.250 0.920 ± 0.053 0.870 ± 0.066 1.000 0 0.000 0.940 ± 0.047 1.000
1.500 0.950 ± 0.043 0.930 ± 0.050 1.000 0 0.000 0.900 ± 0.059 1.000
1.750 0.970 ± 0.034 0.900 ± 0.059 1.000 0 0.000 0.960 ± 0.039 1.000
2.000 0.920 ± 0.053 0.930 ± 0.050 1.000 0 0.000 0.970 ± 0.034 1.000
2.250 0.940 ± 0.047 0.940 ± 0.047 1.000 0 0.000 0.940 ± 0.047 1.000
2.500 0.960 ± 0.039 0.930 ± 0.050 1.000 0 0.000 0.980 ± 0.028 1.000
2.750 0.930 ± 0.050 0.960 ± 0.039 1.000 0 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000
3.000 0.940 ± 0.047 0.940 ± 0.047 1.000 0 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000
3.250 0.990 ± 0.020 0.910 ± 0.056 1.000 0 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000
3.500 0.940 ± 0.047 0.970 ± 0.034 1.000 0 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000
3.750 0.960 ± 0.039 0.950 ± 0.043 1.000 0 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000
as we varied the number of dedicated IDS sensors, hence also varying the sensor coverage
density. We assumed that optimal placement of the sensors allowed one sensor to cover five
meters, and that multiple coverage occurred only if all meters had similar coverage. For
example, four sensors could cover all 20 meters once, and the addition of a fifth sensor would
result in double coverage for five of the meters. We ran each experiment 100 times.
For each of the model architectures, we analyze three trends: the probability that the
attack is detected, the probability that the attack is not detected, and the probability that
the attacker is unwilling to perform the attack. The three trends allow us to use certain
thresholds related to the value of preventing a successful attack to determine the optimal
number of sensors necessary to either detect or deter an attack.
Table 3.2 contains the results of execution of our model for variable sensor coverage den-
sity, utilizing the coverage described previously. We illustrate the detection probabilities
and confidence intervals for the three different failure scenarios—denial of service, remote
disconnect, and information stealing—in Figure 3.12, Figure 3.13, and Figure 3.14, respec-
tively. In each of the figures, the red shading indicates the attacker’s willingness to carry
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out the attack. That can also be thought of as a measure of deterrence. The shaded regions
indicate that the attacker is willing to carry out the attack. Unshaded regions indicate that
the attacker finds the risk to be too high. Figure 3.15 shows the detection reliability for a
general attack, and is used for comparison.
3.7.4 Results
As expected, when an attack always occurred, initial additional sensors drastically increased
the probability that an attack would be detected. However, once the sensor density reached
1.5, the probability of detection leveled out around 0.95. Additional sensors after that point
seemed to be in excess.
The DDoS attack showed slightly different results. As expected, the probability of the
detection of the attack increased with additional sensors. However, in this model, the adver-
sary was not likely to give up the attack. If the detection probability of an attack was greater
than the risk the adversary was willing to take (0.8), then the adversary would decrease the
probability of detection by acquiring more compromised meters. Since the adversary would
only take these steps only if necessary, he or she could underestimate the probability of
detection. Although that would increase the probability of detection for a certain number
of meters, this effect appears to be negligible in our data.
The trends of the remote disconnect attack were heavily governed by the traits of the
adversary: specifically, the lack of willingness to take risks (0.5). Since the adversary was a
corporation that could face serious consequences for getting caught performing an attack, it
was willing to commit to the attack only for the first several sensors. After that, the attack
was completely deterred.
The results for the attack stealing customer information most closely match the results
for an attack always occurring. The similarity is due to the adversary’s high willingness to
take risks. Although the adversary had lower technical skills and knowledge, he or she still
performed the attack almost every time.
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Figure 3.12: Sensor Coverage vs. Detection Reliability (DDoS)
Figure 3.13: Sensor Coverage vs. Detection Reliability (Remote Disconnect)
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Figure 3.14: Sensor Coverage vs. Detection Reliability (Information)
Figure 3.15: Sensor Coverage vs. Detection Reliability (General Attack)
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3.7.5 Discussion
In nearly every case, increasing the density of dedicated sensors increased the detection
reliability of the distributed IDS system. The reasons were the increased reliability of the
sensors and the greater coverage that they provided. We can also gather from our results that
while additional sensors may increase detection reliability, in all scenarios (except remote
disconnect), we hit a peak a sensor density at around 1. That was the first threshold that we
were interested in discovering. Further study is needed to determine whether that density
can be considered optimal, but it does suggest that the cost of additional sensors to increase
coverage may not be justified. As sensor coverage density approaches 1, we see a roughly
linear increase in detection probability. That suggests that it may be easier than originally
thought for utilities to determine the number of sensors needed to achieve a desired detection
rate.
Figure 3.13 shows an interesting result. At a sensor density of 0.75, the attacker willingness
drops to zero, and with it the detection probability. That illustrates a key point in attack
deterrence and reflects the second threshold that we were interested in finding. Some security
measures, like dedicated IDS sensors, are visible to the attacker. An attacker could, for
example, drive around a neighborhood and count the number of IDS sensors. If the attacker
feels there is sufficient security and fears being detected, the attack may never occur. It is
important to note that while the attack detection probability drops to zero, this is expected,
as there are no attacks to be detected. Further analysis needs to be done to vary additional
attack parameters to detect interesting scenarios like the one displayed in Figure 3.13.
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CHAPTER 4
KEY MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
While we mentioned key management concerns in Chapter 3, our analysis thus far has
largely assumed that the IDS architectures have full access to the traffic being monitored.
However, that may not always be the case. Many of the components in AMI networks,
like the smart meters and DCUs, are capable of communicating with each other with data
encryption. Depending on how monitoring solutions are integrated with the AMI, that can
cause complications for both the security of the system and the reliability of the detection.
In this chapter, we will explore requirements for key management in the context of the
operations that would be required in a proper deployment, and then propose ways of ensuring
efficient and reliable detection on AMI deployments that use encrypted traffic taking into
account those requirements. Finally, we discuss possible next steps and future work in
designing an IDS-friendly key management system for AMI.
4.1 Main Key Operations
Secure communication between among devices in AMI is essential in the overall security of
the network. While some of these communications might not contain compromising infor-
mation, sensitive customer information and proprietary utility data are frequently being sent
over the system. To address these concerns, the ANSI C12 standard [36] was developed to
specify requirements for secure communication among devices in AMI networks. According
to the C12.22 standard, messages can be transported in three forms: cleartext, authenti-
cated cleartext, and authenticated ciphertext. However, it is up to device manufacturers
and utilities to set these parameters in their deployments. In order to support the third
option of transporting messages in authenticated ciphertext, certain mechanisms must be in
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place. This includes generating secure encryption keys, ensuring proper communication of
encryption keys to smart devices, supporting protected storage of encryption keys on smart
devices, and mechanisms to support operations like revoking compromised keys and rekeying
large numbers of devices on demand.
These and other factors must be considered when choosing between key management
schemes. In the remainder of this chapter, we explore different ways of integrating IDSes
with key management systems that meet the requirements for AMI.
4.2 Sharing Keys with Sensors
One solution would be to share the decryption keys with the IDS sensors. The IDS sensors
can be given all of the keys they need to decrypt traffic on the network. With all traffic still
encrypted between the meters and the utility, the sensors would be able to decrypt traffic
as needed and use any IDS algorithms for the purpose of detection. That might lower the
computation and power requirements of the sensor, making the embedded infrastructure
possible and allowing more advanced operations on dedicated sensors. Communication of
decryption keys to meters or sensors must be done over a secure channel, and they must be
properly stored. There must also be mechanisms in place to revoke and update the set of
keys as needed.
In the rest of this section, we will look in more detail at considerations in regard to key
management and sharing keys for each of the IDS deployment architectures discussed in
Chapter 3.
Centralized Infrastructure
The main advantage of a centralized IDS deployment is that the sensor will be able to
perform a full analysis on encrypted traffic flowing into and out of the utility. Because
of its proximity to the certificate authority, a centralized sensor would have complete
access to all of the necessary cryptographic keys needed for decrypting traffic. Also,
being housed within the utility data center ensures that the keys are still protected,
assuming the data center is not breached.
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Embedded Infrastructure
For an embedded IDS deployment, it would be more difficult to manage decryption
keys. In order to enable effective detection, the sensors would need to have access to all
of the decryption keys needed to monitor traffic flowing through the meter, including
traffic that is being relayed to other nodes in the network. Determining which keys
need to be shared might be cumbersome, especially if the topology of the network
changes. Sharing of keys would need to be done through a secure communication
channel, and they keys would need to be stored on the meters. We showed before that
meters do not have much physical protection, so the keys would have to be properly
stored, as improper storage would result in a higher impact if a unit were compromised
by an adversary.
Dedicated Infrastructure
Dedicated IDS deployments would share some of the same key management problems.
While there would be fewer sensors to distribute keys to, the necessary decryption
keys would still need to be securely communicated and stored on the dedicated sen-
sors. Distribution would be more manageable, meaning that the added vulnerability
of storing keys in the field would be reduced, but still not eliminated.
Hybrid Infrastructure
A hybrid approach would share the same benefits and risks of the individual architec-
tures. For instance, a deployment consisting of a centralized sensor with embedded
sensors in the field would have the same distribution and storage concerns as the
embedded infrastructure.
4.3 Traffic Classification
Another option would be to monitor encrypted traffic in the AMI. In that case, all traffic
between meters and the utility would be encrypted, and the IDS sensors would not have
access to any decryption keys. However, much work still needs to be done to apply any of
the existing monitoring techniques to AMI protocols. We must also consider the power and
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computational restrictions on the embedded sensors. Monitoring of encrypted traffic poses
a great problem in AMIs, but many efforts have looked at this issue in other contexts. Much
of the work has focused on classifying traffic.
For instance, [37] provides an early traffic analysis technique using Bayesian analysis.
Using known data flows for training, the authors were able to achieve 95% classification
accuracy. [38] extends the classification to a broad set of protocols with varying degrees of
reliability (64%—100%, depending on protocol). Their technique requires human interaction,
as rules must be created for each application (e.g., imap) based on a set of indicators. [39]
takes a different approach and aims to classify traffic by observing and identifying patterns in
flows generated from different hosts. Those authors were also able to achieve 95% accuracy,
but without the need for any training data; they only require access to the traffic flows
collected from the network. Those early techniques were promising, but were not flexible
enough in live environments, nor were they as effective in cases where adversaries were
deliberately trying to evade detection.
On-the-fly techniques for classifying traffic flows were first explored in [40] and extended
in [41] and [42]. Bernaille et al. analyzed sample traffic flows to cluster them into classes that
shared common behaviors. Then, during the online classification phase, they examined the
first five packets for similar behavior. The technique achieved 98% classification accuracy.
[42] extended the techniques to work on encrypted traffic flows like HTTPS. Still, techniques
to circumvent detection were possible, like padding of packet payloads. [43] also looks at
on-the-fly decryption of traffic that uses identity-based encryption. Those authors were able
to prevent MITM attacks, but there are concerns about practicality and performance.
[44] considers a set of features to apply machine learning to a method similar to the one in
[37]. The machine-learning algorithms use the most important features in the classification.
Statistical methods have been used as well, with both [45] and [46] using this technique. [45]
uses training data to develop rule sets used to classify traffic flows, while [46] uses statistical
analysis with existing signature-based methods to classify SSL/TLS payloads with 99%
accuracy.
Other researchers have focused solely on encrypted traffic. For example, [47] takes the
unique approach of looking at round-trip times in communications. Those authors developed
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a methodology for estimating round-trip times along specific network paths, which enables
them to monitor encrypted traffic flows. While the technique does not offer insight into
packet payloads, it might be able to detect MITM attacks.
[48] proposes a centralized IDS scheme that ensures that all traffic is routed through a
centralized sensor as well as to the intended recipient. While the authors demonstrated that
the IDS evasion rate was very low (0.98%), their method relies on all communications being
sent to the sensor, which, for a large AMI deployment, would likely cause bottlenecks in
communications. They expand on that work in [49], in which they developed a protocol
that facilitates routing to the sensor. [50] uses a method based on deep-packet inspection
and takes advantage of vulnerabilities in encrypted traffic to detect peer-to-peer traffic with
a 96% detection accuracy. The method is, however, protocol-specific, and is not easily
adaptable to AMI communication protocols.
Still, the above techniques are useful only in classifying network traffic. Perhaps most
interesting is the work of Koch et al. [51], who present a scheme that allows for detection of
commands within encrypted traffic. Their method does not involve modifying the protocol,
so existing AMI communication protocols can be used, and it uses statistical analysis to
identify the commands being sent. That type of monitoring would be most beneficial to
sensors deployed in AMI networks.
4.4 Partial or Selective Encryption
A third option would be to selectively encrypt communications. For example, a message
containing personal customer information could be signed and encrypted before being sent
back to the utility, but other non-identifying pieces of information could be sent in the clear,
having only been signed by the source. That would allow both the dedicated and embedded
infrastructures to monitor the majority of traffic flows in the AMI network, while protecting
customer information from being sent out in the clear. With that approach, the IDS sensors
would not have access to decryption keys, protecting the system from increased risk if a
meter or sensor were to be compromised. However, it would not be possible to monitor a
message containing encrypted traffic until it reached the utility data center, where it could
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be safely decrypted by a centralized sensor located there. This solution could be enhanced
by including a mechanism to monitor the ratio of encrypted messages to those sent in the
clear. That would help to prevent attackers from hiding their actions in encrypted traffic
without raising any red flags.
Yet another possibility would be to strategically deploy decryption keys to the embedded
and dedicated sensors based on the traffic that is expected to pass through them. That
would limit not only the number of keys on each sensor but also the impact if a meter or
sensor were to become compromised. The strategic deployment could be accomplished in
either the fully encrypted or selectively encrypted environments previously discussed. Secure
communication and storage of the keys would remain crucial.
4.5 Discussion
For the same reasons it is difficult to choose among IDS deployment options, it is difficult
to strongly suggest the proper way to handle key management. In some situations, the
answer is clear. For example, when a centralized IDS infrastructure is being used, we have
already seen how key management can easily be accomplished in a safe and secure manner.
However, when considering the embedded, dedicated, or hybrid infrastructures, for which we
have already demonstrated supporting evidence for their benefits over a centralized approach,
what is the optimal configuration?
Unfortunately, this question and others like it are outside the scope of this thesis. While
there has been significant progress by other researchers looking at the approaches discussed
in this chapter, further work must be accomplished in order to make these key management
schemes AMI- and IDS-friendly. In particular, the best solution should be scalable, so that it
can accommodate the size and magnitude of AMI deployments, as well as practical, so that
it can integrate well with existing solutions. Finally, as utilities are looking to increase their
situational awareness by adding security mechanisms like IDSes, selecting a key management
scheme that allows IDSes to effectively monitor traffic is equally important.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
We have presented a comprehensive analysis of the possible IDS architectures for AMIs while
taking into account the unique environment in which AMI networks operate.
To accomplish that, we first had to understand the threat landscape in AMIs. Our analysis
of attacker motivations and possible techniques that can be used to achieve the corresponding
attacker goals led to a thorough set of failure scenarios. From the failure scenarios, we were
able to extract specific pieces of information that would be required to detect them effectively.
That information guided our assessment of four different IDS architectures; centralized,
embedded, dedicated, and hybrid. We were able to consider the benefits and shortcomings
of each and suggest that a hybrid approach, in which a centralized and dedicated sensor
infrastructure is used, provides the widest coverage in monitoring of attacks. With that in
mind, we modeled such an architecture in Mo¨bius to show the process by which a utility
may weigh architecture options before making an investment.
Finally, we explored various ways of deploying an IDS architecture in an AMI network
that has encryption, and we proposed several possible ways of monitoring such traffic.
Those contributions will help provide utilities with the information they need to deploy
IDSes in their smart grid deployments, enable effective security-monitoring solutions in AMI
deployments across the country, and lay a proper security foundation for future power grids.
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APPENDIX A
MODEL DOCUMENTATION
This appendix contains additional documentation for the models described in Section 3.6
and Section 3.7.
A.1 Basic Meter Model
As described in Section 3.6, the basic meter model consists of a SAN model of a smart meter.
Table A.1 contains the initial markings for the places for this model (Figure 3.5). Table A.2
and Table A.3 contain the enabling predicates and completion functions for the input and
output gates for the same figure, respectively. Table A.4 contains the reward functions for
the performance variables used in the experiment and Table A.5 contains rates used in the
execution of our model.
A.2 Expanded Meter Model
In the expanded model, there are three components: the AMI meter model, the IDS sensor
system model, and the ADVISE adversary model. Table A.6 contains the initial markings
for the places in the AMI meter model (Figure 3.8). Table A.7 and Table A.8 contain the
enabling predicates and completion functions for the input and output gates for the same
model, respectively. Similarly, Table A.9 contains the initial markings for the places in the
sensor system model (Figure 3.7), and Table A.10 and Table A.11 contain the enabling
predicates and completion functions for the input and output gates, respectively.
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Table A.1: Initial markings for places in meter SAN model
Place Name Initial Marking
Attack 0
BrokenSensors 0
DetectedAttack 0
SharedAttack AttackCount
UndetectedAttack 0
WorkingSensors 1
Table A.2: Enabling predicates for input gates in meter SAN model
Input Gate Predicate
IG1 return (MARK(Attack) && !MARK(WorkingSensors));
IG2 return (MARK(Attack) && MARK(WorkingSensors));
Table A.3: Completion functions for output gates in meter SAN model
Output Gate Function
OG1 MARK(Attack)−−;
MARK(UndetectedAttack) + +;
OG2 MARK(Attack)−−;
MARK(UndetectedAttack) + +;
OG3 MARK(Attack)−−;
MARK(DetectedAttack) + +;
Table A.4: Reward functions for performance variables in meter SAN model
Performance Variable Reward Function
TotalAttacks return MARK(SharedAttack);
UndetectedAttacks return MARK(UndetectedAttack);
DetectedAttacks return MARK(DetectedAttack);
SensorWorking return MARK(WorkingSensors);
Table A.5: Experiment variable values for basic meter model
Experiment Variable Value
Attack Count 1
Coverage Rate pc (see Section 3.6.2 and Table 3.1)
DetectAttackRate 950.0
MissAttackRate 50.0
NoCoverageRate 10− pc
SensorFailureRate 0.05
SensorRepairRate 0.98
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Table A.6: Initial markings for places in expanded meter SAN model
Place Name Initial Marking
Attack 0
DetectedAttack 0
ID 0
SharedAttack 0
SharedID 0
SharedWorking 2
UndetectedAttack 0
WorkingSensor 0
Table A.7: Enabling predicates for input gates in expanded meter SAN model
Input Gate Predicate
IG1 return MARK(ID);
IG AutoMissAttack return (!MARK(WorkingSensor) && MARK(Attack));
IG DetectAttack return (MARK(WorkingSensor) && MARK(Attack));
IG ID return (!MARK(ID) && MARK(SharedID));
Table A.8: Completion functions for output gates in expanded meter SAN model
Output Gate Function
OG1 intcoverage[16][21] = {two-dimensional array of coverage vectors}
if(MARK(SharedWorking) > 0 && coverage[11][MARK(ID)])
MARK(WorkingSensor) = 1;
else
MARK(WorkingSensor) = 0;
OG AutoMissAttack MARK(Attack)−−;
MARK(UndetectedAttack) + +;
OG DetectAttack MARK(Attack)−−;
MARK(DetectedAttack) + +;
OG ID MARK(ID) = MARK(SharedID);
MARK(SharedID) = 0;
OG MissAttack MARK(Attack)−−;
MARK(UndetectedAttack) + +;
Table A.9: Initial markings for places in expanded meter sensor system SAN model
Place Name Initial Marking
Broken 0
Change 1
ID 0
SharedID 0
SharedWorking 2
Working 1
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Table A.10: Enabling predicates for input gates in expanded meter sensor system SAN
model
Input Gate Predicate
IG1 return MARK(ID) && MARK(Change);
IG ID return (!MARK(ID) && MARK(SharedID));
Table A.11: Completion functions for output gates in expanded meter sensor system SAN
model
Output Gate Function
Change1 MARK(Change) + +;
MARK(Broken) + +;
Change2 MARK(Change) + +;
MARK(Working) + +;
OG ID MARK(ID) = MARK(SharedID);
MARK(SharedID) = 0;
Update MARK(Change) = 0;
if(MARK(Working))
MARK(SharedWorking)‖ = MARK(ID);
else
MARK(SharedWorking)& =∼MARK(ID);
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